In the last years, the problem of detecting anomalies and attacks by statistically inspecting the network traffic has been attracting more and more research efforts. As a result, many different solutions have been proposed. Nonetheless, the poor performance offered by the proposed detection methods, as well as the difficulty of properly tuning and training these systems, make the detection of network anomalies still an open issue. In this paper, we face the problem by proposing a way to improve the performance of anomaly detection. In more detail, we propose a novel network anomaly detection method that, by means of kernel-PCA, is able to overcome the limitations of the 'classical' PCA-based methods, while retaining good performance in detecting network attacks and anomalies.
Introduction
In the last years, the internet has experienced an exponential growth of the number and level of sophistication of cyber attacks. This fact, together with the unsuitability of the current intrusion detection systems, only able to reveal well-known attacks, has attracted many research efforts towards the problem of detecting anomalies and attacks by statistically inspecting the network traffic and the problem of effectively detecting anomalies and attacks in the network traffic has emerged as a key requirement for the management and administration of IP networks.
As a result, many different solutions based on a statistical analysis of the network traffic behaviour have been proposed. Nonetheless, the poor performance offered by the proposed detection methods, especially in terms of false positive rate, as well as the difficulty of properly tuning and training these systems make the detection of network anomalies still an open issue.
Among the different proposals emerged in the last years, some of the most promising are those based on the use of the principal component analysis (PCA) (Shlens, 2005; Shah-Hosseini, 2011) . In a nutshell, PCA is a linear transformation that maps a coordinate space onto a new one whose axes, called principal components (PCs), have the property to point in the direction of maximum variance of the residual data (i.e., the difference between the original data and the data mapped onto the previous PCs). The basic idea behind the several PCA-based detection methods is to project the measurement data onto a normal subspace (given by the first significant PCs) and consider the residuals to evaluate how much anomalous the data are.
Such an approach has demonstrated to be quite effective in the detection of several network anomalies, as shown by the many proposals (discussed on the related work section). Nonetheless, in a recent work (Ringberg et al., 2007) the authors apply such a method, highlighting some intrinsic difficulties in tuning the system parameters and the caused system instability, thus highlighting how this kind of systems is unsuitable for 'real-world' application, where stability is one of the most important requirements.
Starting from these considerations, in this paper we propose a novel network anomaly detection method that, by means of kernel-principal component analysis (K-PCA), is able to overcome the limitations of the 'classical' PCA-based methods, while retaining good performance in detecting network attacks and anomalies.
This approach represents a completely novel contribution to the field. Indeed, as discussed in the next section, K-PCA has only been discussed as a technique for feature selection before the application of other anomaly detection techniques.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: next section discusses some related works, while Section 3 provides some basic background information on the K-PCA. Then Section 4 details the architecture of the proposed detection system and Section 5 discusses the experimental results. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper with some final remarks.
Related work
Over the years, several solutions have been proposed to detect attacks and anomalies in the networks, as testified by the several surveys on the topic (Callegari et al., 2013; Thottan and Ji, 2003; Patcha and Park, 2007) . In this context, PCA has emerged as a very promising technique for detecting a wide variety of network anomalies.
In Shyu et al. (2003) , the authors first proposed an anomaly detection scheme based on PCA and compared it with a more 'classical' approach based on clustering and local outlier factor (LOF).
The empirical bases for the application of PCA to the anomaly detection field are provided in Lakhina et al. (2004b) , where the authors perform an analysis of several traffic measurements taken over two backbone networks (Abilene and Geant) highlighting, by means of PCA, that these measurements have a small intrinsic dimension. This conclusion allows the authors to think that PCA could be suitable for anomaly detection.
Starting from this previous work, the same authors, in Lakhina (2004) , introduce the subspace method that allows the separation of a high dimensional space occupied by a set of network traffic measurements into disjoint subspaces, as representative of the normal and anomalous components of the original data. The authors also define a method for revealing the anomalies and for pinpointing the traffic aggregates responsible for such anomalies.
In Lakhina et al. (2004a) , the subspace method is applied to three different metrics (packet count, byte count, and IP-flow count) for the detection of different kinds of anomalies.
A step forward in the method is given in Lakhina et al. (2005) , where the previous traffic volume metrics are substituted by the entropy of the empirical distribution of the traffic features, enabling the detection of a larger set of anomalies. The authors also use sketches for aggregating the data.
Other notable techniques that employ the PCA methodology include the works done by Wang and Battiti (2006) , Bouzida et al. (2004) and Wang et al. (2004) .
Finally, some recent papers (Chatzigiannakis et al., 2009; Callegari et al., 2010a Callegari et al., , 2011 Callegari et al., , 2012 have extended the method, so as to improve the detection performance of the system. The first (Chatzigiannakis et al., 2009 ) has introduced a multi metric multi link analysis, which attempts to analyse several traffic features taken on several links at the same time. Instead, in Callegari et al. (2010a Callegari et al. ( , 2011 Callegari et al. ( , 2012 , the authors modify the 'standard' method by introducing a multi timescale approach, making the system able to detect both sudden anomalies (e.g., bursty anomalies) and 'slow' anomalies (e.g., increasing rate anomalies).
PCA-based anomaly detection techniques appear to be suitable for working on the top of a distributed environment. In this framework, some preliminary studies are presented in Liu et al. (2010) and Dusi et al. (2012) .
Despite all these works, in a recent work by Ringberg et al. (2007) , the authors apply the method described in Lakhina et al. (2005) , highlighting some intrinsic difficulties in tuning its parameters and the resulting system instability. In particular, the authors show how the number of dominant PCs is very hard to be determined, causing the system to behave in a strongly unstable way.
Instead, K-PCA is well-known in the literature for behaving better than PCA in all those cases, where some non-linearities in the data are present. Nonetheless, its application to the network anomaly detection field is never directly proposed in the literature [while it is normally applied, as an example, in the hyperspectral imagery field (Gu et al., 2006 (Gu et al., , 2008 ]. Indeed, it is usually applied as a 'pre-filtering phase' to select the features to be used for the detection phase based on other methods. As an example in Gao et al. (2005) , the authors discuss the application of K-PCA to the feature selection problem before applying a SVM-based anomaly detection technique, thus proposing an approach completely different from the one presented in this paper.
Kernel PCA
As already stated in the introduction, PCA is a linear transformation that maps a coordinate space onto a new one, whose axes, called PCs, have the property to point in the direction of maximum variance of the residual data.
Hence, it is intuitively clear that the method behaves very well if the data are linearly distributed in the space (as in the case depicted in Figure 1 ), but it is unsuitable when the data do not present a linear structure (as in Figure 2 , where the dataset is clearly distributed in two concentric spheres).
K-PCA overcomes these limitations of PCA by applying the techniques of kernel methods (Schölkopf et al., 1998) . In a nutshell, using a kernel, the originally linear operations of PCA are done in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space with a non-linear mapping.
Let us analyse the K-PCA algorithm in more detail, by starting from briefly reviewing the standard PCA. Given the matrix of data X = {X i,j }, with 1 < i < N and 1 < j < M (a data set of M samples captured in N time-bins), PCA computes each PC, v i , as the i th eigenvector of the covariance matrix X T X, that is: 1, ...,
where λ i is the 'ordered' eigenvalue corresponding to the eigenvector v i . In practice, the first PC, v 1 , is computed as follows:
and recursively, the k th PC is evaluated as follows:
where || || ⋅ denotes the L 2 norm. As already stated, one of the main issues of PCA is that it is a linear transformation: it allows to map data from a coordinate space onto a linear subspace. With some datasets, PCs might not show on such a subspace, and we might need a non-linear transformation in order to see these correlations. What we first need is an appropriate function Φ to map the 'original' space R to the new space F (Φ: R → F), so that we can apply the previous procedure to the new dataset.
The covariance matrix becomes:
and, thus, we can calculate the eigenvalues λ i ≥ 0 and the eigenvectors v i ∈ F:
If we multiply by Φ(
Substituting (4) in (5), we obtain:
which leads to:
that means that the coefficients a allow us to write v i as a combination of Φ(x j ). At this point, we define a N × N kernel matrix K i,j , as:
By substituting (4) and (8) in (6), we have:
and substituting K i,i , we get
that is:
Equation (12) is the equation to solve (for eigenvalues λ ≠ 0), with λ i and a i eigenvalues and eigenvectors of K. The solutions are then normalised and combined together with (8), (9), and (12), becoming:
In order to extract the PCs, we project the data on the eigenvectors V ∈ F:
Note that if the data are not centred on zero, we need to use Gram matrix instead of kernel matrix: It is easy to see that computing Φ and mapping all the data to a new subset would be a heavy operation: we point out that, the K-PCA procedure allows us to skip all that, calculating an appropriate kernel matrix instead. Such matrix can be built directly from the data x with specific kernel functions.
To sum it up, the steps to be done are:
• building the kernel matrix K [equation (9) • calculation of the PCs with (14).
To exemplify the difference between the use of PCA and K-PCA, let us refer to the application of the two methods to the data shown in Figure 2 . Figure 3(a) shows the data mapped in the new space defined by the two axes r1 and r2, obtained by applying the PCA, while Figure 3(b) shows the same data mapped in the space defined by the two axes obtained by applying K-PCA with a Gaussian kernel. Hence, it is easy to conclude that, in theory, KPCA-based classification methods should behave better than PCA-based methods in all those cases in which the data are not linearly distributed.
System architecture
The development of the proposed system (whose architecture is sketched in Figure 4 ) has been based on the architecture already realised in our previous works on PCA-based detection systems. Indeed, the preprocessing blocks (i.e., time series constructions and sketch computation), as well as the post-processing block (i.e., identification), have been kept very similar to the ones described in Callegari et al. (2012) . This point is strongly justified by the fact that the aim of the paper is to show how we can effectively improve the stability of the different PCA-based detection algorithms. Hence, in the following, we focus on the KPC's computation, just briefly reviewing the other blocks. At first, the NetFlow traffic traces are pre-processed to extract ASCII files, only containing the considered traffic feature (in the experimental section, we present the results obtained by using the quantity of received traffic, but this descriptor can be easily changed). Then these files are fed into the sketch module that is responsible for randomly aggregating the different traffic flows. Sketches are probabilistic data structures (Cormode and Muthukrishnan, 2005) , which result to offer the best performance in aggregating the traffic for anomaly detection purposes (Callegari et al., 2010b) (in this work, the dimension of the sketch has been set in the following way: number of four-universal hash functions i = 8 and number of possible hash outputs w = 64). As an output this module produces, for each distinct time-bin, a sketch containing in each bucket the distribution of the considered feature for the given traffic aggregate, estimated with empirical histogram.
Given the difficulty in handling histograms (that are high-dimensional objects) with low computational resources, we have 'concentrated' the associated information in a single value, by computing the entropy.
At this point, the time series are realised [according to the Turnstile model (Muthukrishnan, 2003) ] by considering the evolution of the entropy of each traffic aggregate over time. Such time series are then combined to form a matrix that contains, for all the aggregates, the values of the entropy estimated in each time-bin.
Such a matrix is given as input to the detection module that at first computes either the PCs or the KPCs (depending on which algorithm is used) and then applies the subspace method. Regarding the K-PCA, the system applies two distinct kernel functions (that result to be the most widely used in the literature):
• Gaussian kernel (or radial basis function):
( 1 6 )
• Polynomial kernel:
It is important to highlight that in case of K-PCA it is necessary to determine, before applying the method, the values of σ for the Gaussian kernel and d for the polynomial kernel. Nonetheless, the experimental tests have demonstrated that the system performance does not strongly depend on such parameters. Indeed, especially when using a polynomial kernel we have verified that choosing a value of d quite high, allows us to obtain very good results, just accepting some computational load (which still remains acceptable for state-of-the-art hardware). In the experimental tests, we have used σ equal to the median of the data variance (as suggested in the literature) and d = 5. Independently of the used algorithm, the idea is to select the dominant PCs/KPCs, by means of the scree plot method, and to apply the subspace method, as described in Callegari et al. (2012) to detect the anomalies. Once the anomalies have been detected, the identification block is responsible for identifying which are the IP addresses that have caused the anomaly.
Experimental results
The proposed system has been tested over a well-known public traffic data-set, composed of traffic traces collected in the Abilene/Internet2 Network (The Ianternet2 Network, http://www.internet2.edu/network/). In more detail, we have taken into consideration the traces related to one week of traffic.
Since these data do not have a ground truth file, we have partially performed a manual verification of the data and, moreover, we have synthetically added some anomalies in the data, so as to be able to correctly interpret the offered results, at least partially.
Given the aim of demonstrating the differences between 'standard' PCA-based systems and our algorithm, we have decided to add 'critical' anomalies (i.e., very low-volume anomalies), so as to test the system in a sort of 'worst-case' scenario (it would be unreasonable to demonstrate that we are able to improve the performance of PCA-based algorithms in those cases in which such algorithms behave almost ideally). As a result, the obtained detection rates can appear unreasonably low, but our aim is to demonstrate the greater stability of our system and not the general performance of PCA-based methods, which is well-known in the literature.
The first graph shows the scree plot related to the application of a 'standard' PCA, K-PCA with a Gaussian kernel (K-PCAG in the following), and K-PCA with a polynomial kernel (K-PCAP).
As it is clear from Figure 5 , when applying the PCA algorithm to the considered data, it is not easy to determine the number of significant PCs. Indeed, while the first PC is able to capture slightly more than the 70% of energy, there are at least five more PCs that capture about 5% of energy each. These results mainly indicate that, as shown in Ringberg et al. (2007) and demonstrated in the following, it is not easy to determine the correct number of PCs to be used in describing the normal subspace, with the consequence that the performance will be strongly different when varying such a number. The other two plots show that things are strongly different when applying K-PCA. Indeed, the curve that corresponds to the application of K-PCAG shows that the first KPC is able to capture more than the 80% of energy and the second about the 10% of energy, with some more KPCs (about 7) that capture a negligible amount of energy (about 1%).
Things get even better when considering the application of K-PCAP, with the first KPC able to capture almost all the data energy. It is worth highlighting that these scree plots basically confirm our intuition about the use of K-PCA instead of PCA. Indeed, while it is clear how to choose such a number in the case of K-PCA, it is very hard to determine the number of dominant PCs for PCA.
The subsequent three plots show the performance offered by the system in terms of detection, when applying the three distinct algorithms. In more detail, Figure 6 shows the percentage of detected anomalies (varying the value of the threshold) for the 'classical' PCA algorithms, Figure 7 refers to the application of KPCAG, and finally Figure 8 relates to K-PCAP.
By comparing the different graphs, realised by varying the number of considered PCs/KPCs, we can easily conclude that applying K-PCA takes to a much more stable behaviour. Indeed, despite offering very similar performance in terms of maximum achievable detection rate, we can see from Figure 6 that the behaviour of the PCA strongly depends on the number of dominant PCs. This dependance is much less significant when applying K-PCA with a Gaussian kernel, and becomes completely negligible when using K-PCA with a polynomial kernel. Indeed, in Figure 8 the different plots, corresponding to the use of a different number of dominant PCs, completely overlap. It is worth highlighting, once more, that the aim of the experimental tests has not been to show the absolute performance of the methods (which is well known from the literature), but to show how our proposal can overcome the limitations of PCA-based methods in terms of system stability. Indeed, our system is able to obtain very good performance independently of the chosen number of KPCs, which is, instead, the main limitation of PCA-based algorithm.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have designed and developed a novel anomaly detection system, based on the use of K-PCA. The experimental results have demonstrated that the proposed algorithms are able to overcome the main limitations of PCA-based systems that are too unstable to be applied in 'real-world' scenarios.
Indeed the proposed system is able to offer very good performance, independently of the correct tuning of the main system parameters.
